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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16,372

ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E.
BRACKENBURY,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This was a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against the defendants-appellants Roger Anderson and Thomas
E. Brackenbury.

The information charged a violation of

U.C.A. §76-8-508, tampering with a witness.

The charge

arose out of an incident which occurred on May 28, 1978, in
Soldier Summit, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was ·tried by a jury in Heber City, Utah, the
Honorable Judge J. Robert Bullock, Fourth District, presiding.
The jury found the defendants guilty as charged in the
information.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of their
conviction and a dismissal of the information.

In the

alternative, the defendants seek a reversal and request this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Court to remand the case for a new trial.
srATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 28, 1978, defendant Roger Anderson was Chief of
Police of the town of Soldier Summit, Utah.

On the same

date, defendant Thomas E. Brackenbury was Justice of the
Peace of the town of Soldier Summit.
In the early evening of May 28, 1978, the defendants
entered the J & M Saloon in Soldier Summit.

Defendant

Anderson's purpose in visiting the J & M Saloon was to
investigate miscellaneous rumors and reports he had receive1
which concerned, among other things, the illegal sale of
The J & M Saloon was operated by one

liquor. T. 153, 183.

of the witnesses at defendants' trial, James Garner.
After a brief misunderstanding with the bartender,
James Garner, and some of his patrons, the defendants seate
themselves at the bar.

After a few moments, the defendant

Anderson requested James Garner, who was at the opposite en
of the bar, to join him and defendant Brackenbury for a
brief conversation.

T. 41.

The purpose of the conversatio

of course, was to determine the validity of the rumors and
reports which Anderson had previously received.
The nature and content of the conversation that ensued
between the defendants and Garner was the subject of
disputed testimony at trial.

Garner testified that the

defendant Anderson immediately "got kind of huffy" and the
conversation rapidly "ended up in an argument."
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T. 41,42.

The defendants testified, however, that Garner responded to
their request with foul and abusive language and summarily
ordered them to leave his premises.

T. 155,183.

During this heated argument, Ray Applegate, a transient
truck driver, attempted to intervene in the dispute in
behalf of James Garner.

T. 58.

Applegate approached the

defendant Anderson and seated himself immediately beside
Anderson.

At the climax of the confrontation between Garner

and Anderson, Garner ordered the defendants to "get the hell
out of here" or "I'll have him [Applegate] throw you out."
T. 155,86.

Garner then told defendant Anderson, with

reference to Ray Applegate, "he's my bouncer," and Applegate
immediately acknowledged this statement.

T. 155-156.

Defendant Anderson identified himself as the Chief of Police
of Soldier Summit

after which Ray Applegate apparently

returned to his seat in the bar.

T. 58.

The confrontation between Garner and Anderson was
_--..

-

brought to an abrupt conclusion when James Garner struck
defendant Anderson as he was drinking a soft drink.
42,156,184.

T.

At this juncture, both Anderson and Brackenbury

immediately left the premises and parted company.
Brackenbury returned to his home.

Defendant

Defendant Anderson

secured the assistance of Butch Curtis, Soldier Summit's
officer on duty at the time, and returned to the J & M
Saloon.

Anderson then directed Curtis to arrest Garner on

the charge of assaulting an officer.

Curtis was then

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

assigned to transport Garner to the Utah County jail.

T.

102.
Anderson returned to the J & M Saloon after Garner's
arrest to gather information and to arrest Ray Applegate for
interfering with an officer.

Applegate, by his own

admission, had consumed a significant amount of alcohol and
was at least partially inebriated.

T. 82-83.

Applegate

wa~

under the influence to the extent that is was necessary for
defendant Anderson to assist him in walking from the bar to
the Justice of the Peace's trailer.

T. 143-144; 159; 184-

186.
The events which took place in defendant Brackenbury's
trailer were the subject of highly contradictory claims at
trial.

The witness Applegate testified that he was forceab:

removed from the J & M Saloon by defendant Anderson to
defendant Brackenbury's trailer.

Applegate also claimed

that he was intimidated in the presence of Anderson and
Brackenbury.

After certain statements had been prepared by

Brackenbury, Applegate testified that he signed the
statements because he would do "anything to get out of
there."

T. 88.

But defendants Anderson and Brackenbury testified
differently.

They insisted that Applegate was completely

drunk, and stumbled about the trailer before finally being
placed in a seat by defendant Anderson.

They also claimed

that defendant Anderson carefully questioned Ray Applegate
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concerning suspected illegal sales of liquor by James
Garner.

Applegate volunteered the information which

comprised the substance of the statements later reduced to
writing and signed by Applegate.

T. 160,185-186.

The

statements have been made part of the record and in essence
charge that James Garner was selling liquor illegally.
Applegate, by his own admission could not read and
write well.

T. 91,99.

The defendant Brackenbury testified

that because of Applegate's inability to write the statements
himself, he, Brackenbury, personally prepared the statements
based upon the questioning of Applegate conducted by
Anderson in Brackenbury's presence.

Brackenbury also

testified that the prepared statement was read by Applegate
in final form, and that it was also read to him so that he
might fully understand the same.

T. 187-189.

A copy of

these statements is reproduced in Appendix A of this brief.
After signing the statement in the presence of defendants
Anderson and Brackenbury as well as George Shage,_ the Mayor
of Soldier Summit, Ray Applegate left Brackenbury's house
trailer and returned to the cafe attached to the trailer.
While at the cafe, Applegate again encountered the defendant
Anderson.

He offered to buy Anderson dinner or at least a

cup of coffee. T. 90.

Applegate then returned to his tractor-

trailer rig, and left the town of Soldier Summit sometime
around midnight. The defendants never saw Ray Applegate
again until trial.

The unsworn statements subscribed to by
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Rcty Applegate were never used in any administrative,
legislative, judicial proceeding or in any other manner
until they were produced in the course of a discovery
deposition of Brackenbury and thereafter used as evidence ir
the course of the trial of these defendants.
After the discovery deposition of Brackenbury by the
County Attorney's office, the defendants Anderson and
Brackenbury were charged with a violation of U.C.A. §76-8508, tampering with a witness.

The defendants requested

and were granted a preliminary hearing.

But the State's ke)

witness, Ray Applegate, was not present at the hearing.

ThE

County Attorney was given permission to introduce Applegate'
affidavit wherein he made the substantive allegations which
formed the foundation of the information.

The defendants

were denied their right to confront and cross-examine
Applegate at the hearing.

On this charge, the defendants

were convicted on the 31st day of January, 1979.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS ROGER ANDERSON AND THOMAS BRACKENBURY WERE,
IN EFFECT, DENIED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
A preliminary hearing did not exist at common law, and
there is generally no federal constitutional right to a
preliminary hearing.

But cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.

103, 126, 95 s.ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

Thus, a so-

called "right to a preliminary hearing," if any right there
be, must derive from State statute or constitution.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

21

Am.Jur. 2d 445, Criminal Law §442.
The Utah Constitution provides a constitutional right
to a preliminary hearing in Article I, §13:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by
information after examination and commitment
by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the
State . . • . (Emphasis added.)
Concerning Article I, §13, this Court has written:
And before the defendant can be
so bound over and held to answer
by the magistrate, he is entitled
to a preliminary hearing, unless,
with the consent of the State, he
waives such hearing which under the
Constitution, the statutes, and
authorities cited supra, he may do.
State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125, 71
P.2d 196, 199 (1937). (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, to citizens of this State is preserved a
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing before an
accused can be properly held to answer for a crime.
That the constitutional right in Utah to a preliminary
--~

-

hearing is a "substantial one," was early recognized by this
Court.

State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 P.300, 304-305

(1915). Indeed,

if a defendant is denied a preliminary

hearing, "the cause must be reversed, regardless of the other
claimed errors in the trial.

That [a] defendant cannot

lawfully be tried and convicted on a charge upon which [he]
was not given, or on which [he] did not waive a preliminary
hearing is elemental.

[Citations.]"

State v. Jensen, 103

Utah 478, 136 P. 2d 949, 951-952 (1943).

(Emphasis added.)
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One of the rights, long recognized, which inheres in the
right to a preliminary hearing,

is the defendant's right to

rebutt the evidence presented by the State at such hearing.
Freeman, supra, at 200.
~ccognized

Moreover, the Legislature has

that the viability of the defendant's right to a

preliminary hearing depends upon his ability to adequately
counter the evidence introduced by the State.

In harmony

with this recognition, the Legislature has codified
the procedures to be followed at the preliminary hearing.
See Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.), §§77-15-1, et seq.

Thus,

that the defendant's presentation might be meaningful at th
preliminary examination, §77-15-2 provides that he be given
reasonable time to secure counsel.

Section 77-15-8 grants

the defendant the right to deploy the State's sovereign
power in his behalf to subpoena witnesses for his presentat
But one of the most fundamental procedures to buttress
the defendant's right to counter the State's evidence at th
hearing,

is expressed in §77-15-10:
The witnesses must be examined
in the presence of the defendant, and
may be cross examined in his behalf.
(Emphasis added.)

Section 77-15-10 guarantees the accused the right to
confront his accusers and have them cross examined in his
presence, from the earliest practical point in the crimina:
prosecution process--at the preliminary hearing.

This

statutory procedural protection is consistent with the
United States Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV, and the
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Utah Constitution, Article I, §12, which preserve the
defendant his right to confront his accusers at trial.
also U.C.A. §77-1-8(4).

See

In Utah, the right of confrontation

exists not only at trial, but also at the preliminary
hearing.
In considering Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution,
this Court has stated:
Under the constituion and statutes
of the state the accused had a right to
be present at the trial, to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, and to meet
his accusers face to face . . . .
He had the right, not only to examine
the witnesses, but to see into the
face of each witness while testifying
against him, and to hear the testimony
given upon the stand.
He had the
right to see and be seen, hear and be
heard, under such reasonable regulations
as the law established.
State v.
Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542, 544
(1899).
(Emphasis added.)
In elaborating upon the guarantees set forth in Mannion,
this Court explained in State v. King, 24 Utah 482, 68 P.
418, 419 (1902):

_-....,,.

-

The chief purpose in requiring that
the accused shall be confronted with the
witnesses against him is held to be to
secure to the defendant an opportunity for
cross-examination; so, that if the
opportunity for cross-examination has been
secured, the test of confrontation is
accomplished.
See also State v. Kendrick
538 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah, 1975).
The right to a preliminary hearing in this State is
fundamental.

Part and parcel of that right is the right to

present one's rebuttal to the State's evidence.

The right

to confront one's accusers at trial is also fundamental
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constitutional law.

But in Utah, the basic right of

confrontation and cross examination of witnesses has been
secured the accused not only at trial, but also at his
preliminary hearing.

Section 77-15-10, supra.

In light of

these principles, defendants Anderson and Brackenbury were
effectively denied their constitutional right to a preliminc
hearing.
Although the defendants were actually given a prelimiru
hearing in this case, they were not afforded the

constitut~

and statutory rights enumerated above; in fact, these right
were compromised to such an extent that they were effective
denied their constitutional right guaranteed in Article I,
§13 of the Utah Constitution.
The State's burden at the preliminary hearing has been
described before by this Court:
A preliminary hearing is the procedure
by which the State puts on sufficient
evidence to convince a committing magistrate
that the crime charged has been committed and
that there is sufficient cause to believe the
defendant committed it.
Seibold v. Turner,
20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 289, 290-291 (l967).
At the preliminary hearing in this case, two witnesses
testified for the State and were cross examined by defense
counsel.

James Garner testified as to an altercation he

had with one of the defendants on May 28, 1978.

~

PHT 34-35

Garner's testimony did not even remotely relate to any of
the elements of the crime of witness tampering under U.C.A
§76-8-508.

Irvine J. Curtis testified as to two conversat
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which he had had with the defendants, one on the night of
May 28, 1978, and the other some weeks later.

PHT 38-40.

The testimony, if believed by the magistrate, would tend to
estahlish that defendant Roger Anderson had used some force
in securing the arrest of James Garner and a statement from
Ray Applegate.

But neither Garner nor Curtis testified as

to a single element of the crime of witness tampering under
the statute.

Their testimony was irrelevant to establishing

the elements of the crime, and the State did not meet its
burden at the preliminary hearing to show "that the crime
charged [had] been committed and that there [was] sufficient
cause to believe the defendant [ s]

[had] committed it."

Seibold, supra.
But the State supplemented the in-court testimony of
Garner and Curtis with certain affidavits sworn to by Ray
Applegate, the only witness of the State who could testify
as to the elements of the crime with which defendants had
been charged. The State sought admission of

the~aocuments

under U.C.A. §77-15-19, which reads in relevant part:
(2) The rules of evidence for trial of
criminal cases shall apply at the preliminary
examination, except that hearsay evidence
that would not be admissible at trial shall
be admitted if the court determines that it
would impose an unreasonable burden on one
of the parties or on a witness to require
that the primary source of the evidence be
produced at the hearing, and if the witness
or party furnishes information bearing on
the informant's reliability and, as far as
possible, the means by which the information
was obtained. When hearsay evidence is
admitted, the court, in determining the existence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of sufficient cause, shall consider:
(~)
The extent to which the hearsay
q:1ali':/ of the evidence affects the weight
it sh;_·Jld be given, and
(b)
The likelihood of evidence other
than hearsay being available at trial to
provide the information furnished by hearsay
at the preliminary examination.
An extended discussion of the merits and meaning of
§77-15-19 was conducted by the court and counsel.
19-30.

See PHT

During this discussion, counsel for the defendants

made numerous objections to the constitutionality of §77-15
19 (PHT 21-22, 24, 29), as well as specific objections to

PH

the application of the statute in this particular case.
19-20, 21, 23-24, 28.
Defendants' arguments, announced at the preliminary
hearing and reiterated here, are essentially two.

First,

the documents produced by the State were sworn affidavits
made by Ray Applegate, and were therefore not hearsy.

The

clear wording of the statute makes it applicable to hearsa1
only, and the introduction of the affidavits of Applegate
was not provided for by the statute.

The State sought, fo

the sake of its own convenience, to circumvent the
defendants' rights under U.C.A. §77-15-10 to confront and
cross examine the State's key witness, the effect of which
circumvention was to compromise the defendants' right to a
preliminary hearing under the Utah Constitution.

Moreover

this Court has expressed its disdain with the introductior
of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings.
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178, 183 (1943).

State v.
(To satisf
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its quest for convenience, the State could have produced
Applegate at the preliminary hearing; afforded the
defendants their full rights to confront and cross examine
him at the hearing; and then not produced him at trial,
introducing the transcript of the preliminary hearing
instead.

Under well-settled constitutional law, the

defendants under such an arrangement would not have been
denied their rights under Article I, §12 of the Utah
Constitution, King, supra, at 419, nor under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-166, 90 S. Ct. 1930,
26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).)
Secondly, the statute, as it was applied in the
preliminary hearing of these defendants, is so inconsistent
with Article I, §§12 and 13 of the Utah Constitution and
U.C.A., §77-15-10 that it either must be declared unconstitutional in tote, or be deemed to have been rendered inapplicable
by these constitutional and statutory provisions insofar as the
case at bar is concerned.

The State's introduction of

Applegate's affidavits completely foreclosed the defendants
from cross examining him at the preliminary hearing
any of the elements of the alleged crime.

~

A valuable source

of pre-trial criminal discovery was foreclosed.

Moreover,

because the testimony of Garner and Curtis was otherwise
insufficient to fulfill the State's burden at the hearing,
the defendants were effectively bound over and held to

-13-
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answer via a pseudo-preliminary hearing that was such a sh,
as to be an unacceptable compromise of the defendants'
constitutional rights to a qualitative hearing.

That the

dignity of the constitutional right to a preliminary hearir
in this State might be preserved, and because the prejudicE
to the defendants of an inadequate preliminary hearing in
this case threatened proper trial preparation and
presentation, the defendants respectfully request that the
conviction be reversed.
POINT II
SECTION 76-8-508 OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE IS UNCONST:
TIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERBROAD.
The constitutional test against which a purportedly
vague statute must be scrutinized was enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construe
269 u.s. 385, 46 s.ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926), and
followed by this Court in State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369,
250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952):
The terms of a penal statute creating
a new offense must explicitly inform those
who are subject to it the conduct on their
part which will render them liable to its
penalties . . . and a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.
Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
(Emphasis
added.)
The test of unconstitutional statutory overbreadth wa
stated by this Court in State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 839
(Utah, 1978):
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A criminal statute is overbroad when
it, in a substantial way, prohibits lawful
acts as well as unlawful acts.
In the case at bar, the defendants were charged with
the violation of U.C.A. §76-8-508, which reads in pertinent
part:
Tampering with witness--retaliation against
witness or informant bribery. A person is
guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) believing that an official proceeding
or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise
cause a person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely
"Official proceedings" are defined in §76-8-501, but no
definition or other explanation is given for the terms
"induce," "otherwise cause," "testify," or "inform."
A close reading of the statute divulges that the
Legislature has failed to include, as an element of the
offense, the requirement of a mens rea or criminal intent.
Well-recognized terms such as "intentionally," "willfully,"
"knowingly," "recklessly," or "wrongfully" delineate the
mental element necessary for the commission of a criminal
act.

State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Utah, 1977).

All of these terms are conspicuously absent from the present
statute.
But the term "believing" is found within the statute,
and it obviously connotes some kind of state of mind necessary
to the commission of the offense.

The defendants suggest,

however, that the term "believing" describes only the state
of knowing that an official proceeding is pending or about
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to be instituted, and in no way modifies or elucidates the
phrases "attempts to induce" or "otherwise cause."

If the

statute had contemplated a mens rea requirement as a
necessary element of the crime of witness tampering, it
would have had to have been written accordingly:
(1)
Believing that an official proceeding
or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he [knowingly] attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a)

Testify or inform falsely . • •

(For the term "knowingly," any of the other terms

mention~

above could be substituted, as long as at least one was
present.)
It is well-settled law that the State may make certair
acts criminal which are unaccompanied by a mens rea.

StatE

Twitchell, 8 Utah2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1959); State
v. Cutshaw, 7 Ariz. App. 210, 437 P.2d 962, 972-973 (1968).
But, "the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo American
criminal jurisprudence."
494, 499-500, 71

s.

u.s

Dennis v. United States, 341

Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951).

Becaus.

of its aberrational and exceptional character as a crimina
statute which does not prescribe a mens rea for the
commission of the offense which it describes, §76-8-508
compels a man of common intelligence to "guess at its

me~

and differ as to its application," and it sweeps within it
ambit "lawful acts as well as unlawful acts."
No better example of the above conclusion can be four

-16-
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than the circumstances of the present case.

Ray Applegate

was the subject of a police investigation and he was being
interrogated at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime, by the local chief of police, defendant Anderson.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the tremendous
"compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" and has
declared that the atmosphere of such investigations, "carries
its own badge of intimidation."

Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 457-458, 86 s.ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Thus, the very nature of the investigation being conducted
by defendant Anderson may have tended, in a very subtle but
real way, to "induce" or "otherwise cause" Ray Applegate to
"testify or inform falsely."

In fact, all police investigations

may have this same tendency, so intimidating are the usual
circumstances, to subtlely "induce" or "otherwise cause" a
criminal suspect or witness to inform falsely.
Because §76-8-508 requires no mens rea as an element of
the offense of tampering, it sweeps within

its~~~bit

otherwise

lawful and innocent conduct of the police acting within the
proper scope of their social functions.

Section 76-8-508 is

so vague that the reasonable policeman could never conclusively
know which of his acts induced or otherwise caused criminal
conduct under the statute.

For these reasons, U.C.A. §76-8-

508 should be declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
(U.C.A. §76-8-508 is, with a minor exception, a carbon copy
of Model Penal Code, Art. 241, §241.6 [Proposed Official
Draft, 1962).

Utah's sister states which have adopted this
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..
section have changed the Model Penal Code text, and have
added the

necessary~

rea element.

See, e.g. Haw. Rev.

Stat., §710-1072; Tex. Pen;:il Code Ann. tit. 8, §36.05 (Vern
The Utah provision is also broader than the Model Penal Cod
and the Texas and Hawaii statutes in that the Utah provisio
substitutes the broad, general term "person" in subsection

(1) for the original, and more narrow and specific terms of
the Model Penal Code--"witness or informant.")
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY ITS
ERRONEOUS AND INADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
The defendants' requested instructions together with
the instructions which the court actually gave are found

ir

the official court file on pp. 77-84, and pp. 88-101.
Defense counsel's specific objections to the instructions (
the trial court are found in the Transcript on pp. 217-219.
As noted above, U.C.A., §76-8-508 is not a paragon of clar
important terms are undefined, and the statute's lack of a
~

rea element tends to propound vagueness and overbread

These statutory deficiencies had a profound effect upon

t~

accuracy and adequacy of the instructions given the jury.
Defense counsel objected to the instructions of the
trial court which dealt with the elements of the crime of
witness tampering; namely, to the court's Instructions No.
and No. 7. In No. 6, the court read the jury the pertinen1
st3tute for the violation of which the defendants had beer
charged.

The critical terms of the statute are left unde
-18-
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in the Code, and the trial court failed to remedy this
deficiency in its instructions. Defense counsel's objection
was that No. 6 "was not followed up with specific instructions
defining the terms that are used in the statute, which terms
are encompassed in the Requested Instructions submitted by
the defendants

." T. 217.

The error committed in so far as Instruction No. 6 is
concerned was compounded by the trial court's erroneous
instruction as to the elements of the crime of tampering
under the statute.

The trial court instructed the jury in

Instruction No. 7:
To constitute the crime of tampering
with a witness as it applies to the circumstances
of this case, it must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt:
1. That the defendants believed an
official proceeding or investigation was
either pending or about to be instituted
pertaining to suspected illegal sale of liquor
by Mr. James Garner, doing business as J & M
Saloon, and
2.
That they induced or otherwjs~ caused
Ray Applegate to make a false statement. * * *F. 91.
(Emphasis added.)
The defendants' counsel strongly objected at trial to this
instruction.

T. 217.

Instruction No. 7 is an inaccurate statement of the law.
The statute plainly requires that before a person can be convicted
of the crime of tampering he must have, inter alia, induced
or otherwise caused a person to "testify or inform falsely."
No matter how morally reprehensive it might be to cause some
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

one to "make a false statement," in effect to lie, such is
not a crime under this statute.

If the defendant does not

cause the victim to testify or inform falsely, he cannot be
convicted- under the statute no matter how many false
statements or lies he causes another to communicate.

Of

course, much depends upon the definition this Court gives
the words "testify" and "inform".
Counsel also excepted to the trial court's failure to
give defendants' Requested Instructions No. 2 and No. 3
which properly define the terms "testify" and "inform."

T.

218.
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 2 states:
Testify as used in the statute means to give
evidence according to law.
"Testify" is a highly specific term and means more than
merely "making statements."

This specific meaning is

amplified in Blacks Law Dictionary (4th Ed., 1968) at 1646
TESTIFY.
To bear witness; to give evidence
as a witness to make a solemn declaration,
under oath or affirmation, in a judicial inquiry
for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.
[Citations.]
That the meaning of the word "testify" is to make
statements "under oath or affirmation" is borne out by a
legion of citations in 41A Words and Phrases 28, "TESTIFY.
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 2 substantially
embodied this concept.

The difference between giving

evidence according to law, upon oath or affirmation, and
merely making statements is fundamental.

The trial court
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Instruction No. 7 was an inaccurate statement of the law,
and the failure to give defendants' Requested Instruction
No.

2 allowed the jury to convict these defendants for

causing Applegate to make false statements, not for causing
him to testify falsely as the statute requires.

Moreover,

if this Court sustains Instruction No. 7, and causing or
inducing someone to make false statements without criminal
intent becomes a crime under the statute and the Court's
interpretation thereof, then §76-8-508 would be totally
unconstitutional on the grounds of overbreadth.

Such

interpretation would make a mere lie a third degree felony
and subject a defendant to criminal strict liability because
he could always be charged with "believing" that somewhere
in this State, some kind of proceeding or investigation was
pending or about to be instituted.
Counsel objected to the trial court's failure to give
Requested Instruction No. 3 which defined the term "inform":
Inform as used in the statute means
to make an accusation against another-whom
he suspects of the violation of some penal
statute. T. 218.
The word "inform" is apparently a general term, and has
no specific meaning to the same extent as the word "testify."
See 21 words and Phrases, 605, "INFORM".

Under the familiar

doctrine of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, the
general term "inform" must be given a more specific interpretation in view of the preceding highly specific term,
"testify."
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Thus, to "inform• under the statute requires an "oath or
affirmation."
statutory term,

Defendants' additional interpretation of the
in Requested Instruction No. 3, suggested

that an oath or affirmation had to be made in the form of
"accusation against another" suspected "of the violation
some penal statute."

0

of

The failure to give Requested

Instruction No. 3, compounded the error of the trial court
in giving Instruction No. 7, and the jury convicted the
defendants for having caused Ray Applegate to "make false
statements" rather than for having caused him to "inform
falsely" as required by §76-8-508.

The trial court could

have substantially overcome these fatal deficiencies in

it~

instructions had the Court given the defendants' Requested
Instruction Nos. 2, 3, and 7.
In Requested Instruction No. 4, defense counsel set
forth the substance of one of his theories of the case:
If you find that the statements signed
by Ray Applegate were voluntarily signed by
him, you must find the defendants not guilty.
That the defendants were entitled to have the jury

instru~

on their theories of the case, for which competent eviden0
had been adduced,

is the rule in this State.

State v. New

105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290, 292 (1943); State v. Johnson,
112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738, 743-744 (1947); and State v.
Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1979).
The defense theory was that Ray Applegate, although
intoxicated, had voluntarily signed the statements prepare
by the defendants.

The testimony of both the defendants
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supported this theory,

(T. 159-161, 186-189) and it was

prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse Requested
Instruction No. 4.

If Applegate did voluntarily sign the

statements, then, regardless of his inebriated condition,
and regardless of the falsity of the statements, defendants
could not be guilty of the crime for which they were charged.
By having refused this instruction, the trial court denied
the jury its prerogative to consider the defendants' theory
of the case, and effectively hampered the defendants'
constitutional right to present a defense.

See In re Oliver,

33 U.S. 257, 273, 275, 68 s.ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948),
and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct.
1038, 35 L.Ed 2d 297 (1973).
Requested Instruction No. 5 posited another of the
defendants' theories of the case:
Should you find the statements signed by
Applegate were not voluntarily signed, you
must nevertheless find the defendants not
guilty if you also find any of the f9Jlowing
to be true:
1. The statements signed were factually
correct
If the statements signed by Applegate were true, and
James Garner had been selling liquor illegally and had
interfered with the investigation being conducted by the
defendants, then Anderson and Brackenbury could not be found
guilty as charged.

The above analysis on the right of a

defendant to have his theory of the case presented to the
jury if he has introduced evidence in support thereof, is
equally applicable here.
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The testimony of Jack Danzy and Michael Branegan
supported the defendants' contention that James Garner had
been selling liquor illegally.

T. 118-124, and 199-201.

The defendants both testified as to the altercation between
Anderson and Garner.

T. 156 and 183-184.

Enough competent

evidence had been introduced to warrant the submission of
this theory of defendants to the jury.
t~

Finally, the trial court erred in refusing to give
defendants' Requested Instruction No. 6 which stated:
When you are considering the credibility
and ability to remember of a witness you
may take into consideration, among other
things, the state of intoxication of the
witness and the extent to which it has
affected his ability to remember events and
occurrences.

Ray Applegate was the key witness for the prosecution
His testimony was the most damning to these defendants.
rebuttal to his testimony, the defendants' testimony substantially contradicted every major part of his story.

D

considering the defendants' testimony, however, the jury
consciously or subconsciously was scrutinizing and weighir
the credibility of the same.

Everything to which the

defendants testified could have been in the eyes of the
jury, in the defendants' own self interest.

That recogni·

by the jury probably had a profound effect upon their
assessment of the defendants' credibility.
Substantial evidence was introduced at trial concern
the intoxicated state of Ray Applegate in the afternoon
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a

evening of May 28, 1978.

T. 143-144; 159-161 and 184-186.

Even Applegate, in cross examination, admitted that he had
consumed a substantial amount of liquor on the afternoon and
evening in question.

T. 82-84.

There can be no question that one's perception of
events and circumstances is different when one is even
partially inebriated.

This difference in perception has a

substantial effect on one's credibility when recounting
experiences gained while inebriated, even in a subsequent,
more sober setting.

The battles fought, the dragons slain,

the women charmed, and the mighty deeds done are somehow far
less credible when one knows that the storyteller was inebriated
at the time of his retold triumphs.
As a proper counter-balance to the jury's conscious or
sub-conscious assessment of the defendants' credibility, the
jury should have been instructed to consider Ray Applegate's
state of intoxication as it related to his credibility as
the State's primary witness.

The failure to have given that

instruction unmistakenly prejudiced the cause of the
defendants.
Because of the failure of the trial court to properly
instruct the jury as outlined herein, this Court should
reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ROGER ANDERSON AND THOMAS BRACKENBURY CANNOT
BE GUILTY OF VIOLATING 76-8-508 AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The point is simple--the State never proved that Ray
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Applegate testified or informed falsely.

The statements to

which Ray Applegate signed his name on May 28, 1978 were m
evidence given according to law, under oath or affirmation,
Thus, he was not induced or otherwise caused to testify
falsely. Moreover, Applegate never made an oath or
affirmation in the form of an "accusation against another"
suspected "of the violation of some penal statute."
Applegate did not inform falsely.

t~

The insufficiency of

evidence in this regard leads to the conclusion that the
defendants could not be guilty of having violated the
statute as a matter of law.
Moreover,

even if Applegate was induced or otherwise

caused to make false statements, the State failed to show
that such were ever used in an official proceeding, or
intended to be used in such a proceeding.

ev~

Implicit within

76-8-508 is the requirement that the false testimony or
information have been actually used in an official
proceeding.

At the time the Applegate statemen-ts-were

given, only a police investigation was pending, and the
State failed to show that the defendants knew or believed
any official proceeding whatsoever was pending or about to
be instituted.

The statements themselves were never used

any proceeding until their admission into evidence at the
trial of these defendants.

Any contentions to the contrar

were never proven at trial.
Assuming, arguendo, that the statements made by Apple
were completely and totally false,

and that the defendants
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knew that the statements were false, the defendants are,
nevertheless, not guilty, as a matter of law, of the crime
charged.

There is no question that Applegate was never in

any manner or at any time requested to testify in any proceeding
concerning the illegal sale of liquor.

The evidence

demonstrated that Applegate left town the evening of the
event and did not return to the State of Utah until the day
prior to the trial of this case.

Applegate was never requested

to "inform" any person other than the defendants, nor were
his written statements ever used to "inform" any persons other
than the defendants.

The defendants themselves could not be

"informed" falsely because they would know these statements
were false.
Based upon the above analysis, the cause should be
reversed because the defendants cannot be guilty, as a
matter of law, of violating the statute.
POINT V
DEFENDANT THOMAS BRACKENBURY WAS GRANTED I-MM-UNITY AND
THEREFORE, WAS IMPROPERLY TRIED AND CONVICTED.
Traditionally, two kinds of immunity from criminal
prosecution have received constitutional recognition and
approbation--"use and derivative use" and "transactional"
immunity.

Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92

S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

Transactional immunity

precludes prosecution "for any 'transaction, matter or
thing' about which the witness is compelled to testify."
.'.'tate~

ward, 571 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah, 1977).

(Wilkins,
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J., dissenting.) Use and derivative use immunity, however,
"pcohibits the use of immunized testimony or other immuni 21
information, but does not prohibit a subsequent prosecutio
based on independent evidence."

Id.

In outlining the scope of immunity in Utah, the
Legislature failed to deploy the traditional nomenclature
either "transactional" or "use and derivative use" immunit
The statute, which was the subject of vigorous controversy
in Ward, supra, reads in pertinent part:
In any investigation or prosecution of a
criminal case, the attorney general and any
district attorney or county attorney shall
have the power to grant immunity from prosecution to any person who is called or
who is intended to be called as a witness
in behalf of the State of Utah whenever the
attorney general, district attorney or
county attorney deems that the testimony of
such person is necessary to the investigation
and prosecution of such a case.
No
prosecution shall be instituted against
the person for any crime disclosed by his
testimony which is privileged under this
action, provided that should the person
testify falsely, nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent prosecution
for perjury.
U.C.A., §77-45-21 (Emphasis
added).
Although the statute does not specifically use the
terms "use and derivative use" or "transactional," the d
inference is that the immunity authorized under this sect
is transactional.

The statute states that "no prosecutio

shall be instituted against the person for any crime disc
by his testimony which is privileged under this action,"
this language,
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although.not the traditional language of
tran~action, m~t~er or thing," conveys a
meaning more similar to that of transactional
immunity.
Furthermore, it is specifically
set out that this statute confers the "power
to grant immunity from prosecution." Were
the statute intended to be the use type, more
precise wording would have been used, not
precluding prosecution, but precluding the
use of immunized testimony in a prosecution.
Ward, supra, at 1347 (Wilkins, J. dissenting,
with whom Maughan, J. concurred.)
The majority in Ward did not reach the issue as to the
quality of immunity conferred by the statute.
In the present case, the defendant Thomas Brackenbury's
deposition was taken on July 11, 1978.

During the course of

the taking of the deposition, and in response to defense
counsel's assertion of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights
unless immunity were granted, the County Attorney responded:
MR. CALL: Well, the County Attorney's office
will grant Mr. Brackenbury immunity as to the
testimony regarding the incident in the bar
and involving James Garner and as to nothing else.
MR. UNGRITCH:
Is that going to be the limit
of the scope of examination at this time?
MR. CALL: Well, to the extent that we are able
to go beyond that we will. We will go into that
in some detail, but we have other areas we'd like
to go into, but we will grant immunity only to
the incident relating to the bar and to James
Garner, and to his activities as Justice of the
Peace in relation to the arrests and the people
brought before him.
Deposition of Thomas Brackenbury,
at p. 4.
(Emphasis added.)
It is defendant Brackenbury's position that the County
Attorney actually granted him immunity in two independent
areas, either of which was sufficient to preclude his prosecution
and conviction in this case.

First, Brackenbury was granted
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immunity as to "testimony regarding the incident in the
and involving James Garner."

b~

What the County Attorney was

actually thinking when he made this statement is irreleven1
it is what he communicated to counsel and the defendant
which should control this inquiry.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the defendant was
compelled to testify about the "incident in the bar" becaw
of the grant of transactional immunity.

During the course

of that testimony, the defendant revealed other

"transact~

matters, and things" relating to the charge on which he
actually convicted.

w~

The statute clearly states that "no

prosecution shall be instituted against the person for any
crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged under
this action," and in order to preserve the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination--which
right immunity statutes are designed to protect--any
ambiguities in a grant of immunity must be resolved agains
the governmental officer making the grant.
Secondly, Brackenbury was granted immunity as "to his
activities as Justice of the Peace in relation to the arre
and the people brought before him."

This statement of

immunity is so broad that, on its face and with little
analysis, defendant submits that it easily encompasses the
charge on which he was ultimately convicted.
It was the theory of the State at trial that Brackenb
was acting in his office as Justice of the Peace at the ti

-30-
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the alleged crime took place.

It was the uncontradicted

testimony of the State's key witness, Ray Applegate, that
Brackenbury had announced at the time of the alleged
incident that "the Justice Court of Soldier Summit, Utah is
in session--it is in session" and proceeded to inform
Applegate that he was "charged with interferring with an
officer."

T. 63.

Whether this confrontation between the

defendant and Applegate is deemed an arrest, arraignment, or
preliminary hearing is irrelevent in so far as the determination
of the question of immunity is concerned.

The confrontation

was obviously within the scope of defendant's "activities as
Justice of the Peace" and related to "the arrests and the
people brought before him," and was thus within the grant of
immunity referred to above.

Again, the County Attorney's

subjective state of mind is irrelevent to this consideration.
Defense counsel made a timely motion to dismiss as to
Thomas Brackenbury, based upon the grant of immunity, well
in advance of the preliminary hearing.

Again at the

preliminary hearing, counsel objected to the further
prosecution of the defendant on the grounds of the immunity
granted.
trial.

PHT 31.
T. 70.

The same objection was also raised at

Perhaps because of the confusion and

controversy which surrounds §77-45-21, defendants motions
were denied.

It should be remembered, however, that:

a state cannot substitute for the privilege
against self-incrimination an intricate
[)r confusingly inadequate] scheme for
conferring immunity and thereafter hold in
contempt those who have failed to fully
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perceive its subtleties.
81 Am.Jur.2d 94,
Witnesses §58.
Cf. Stevens v. Marks, 383
U.S. 234, 242-244, 86 S.Ct. 788, 15 L.Ed.2d
724 (1966).
Defendant Thomas Brackenbury respectfully prays that
his conviction be reversed on the ground that he was granb
complete immunity from prosecution for this charge.
CONCLUSION
Because the defendants were denied their constitutioru
right to a fair preliminary hearing; because the statute
under which they were charged and convicted is unconstitut
vague and overbroad; because the ambiguities of the Statub
itself were propounded to the jury by inadequate jury
instructions; and because the defendants, based upon the
evidentiary presentation at trial, could not as a matter o'
law have been guilty of violating the statute, the defen&
respectfully request this Court to reverse their convict~
and dismiss the information.

In the alternative,

the

defendants request the Court to reverse the cause and re~
the same for a new trial.
Because defendant Brackenbury was granted immunity ~
the County Attorney, pursuant to statutory authority, his
conviction should be vacated and his name should be expu~
from the public records of these proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 19th day of July, 1979.
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MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants
to Mr. J. Harold Call, Wasatch County Attorney, 30 North
Main Street, Suite 13, Heber City, Utah 84032, and Mr.
Robert Hansen, Attorney General, State of Utah, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 19th
day of July, 1979.
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